Short Bio of Soviet Spy, Jean-Louis Gagnon

Jean-Louis Gagnon

Jean-Louis Gagnon

In Part Three of my Audio Transcript of highlights from Alan Stang’s April 1971 article in American Opinion, “CANADA – How The Communists Took Control,” Stang likens Jean-Louis Gagnon to “Joseph Goebbels” and “Spiro Agnew”. Says Stang in “The Rest Of The Ring” segment:

Pierre has created Information Canada, named Gagnon to run it at $40,000 a year. Jean-Louis doesn’t really need it, because his father, like Pierre’s, was also a millionaire. Trudeau has also appointed Gagnon Co-Chairman of the influential Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.

Who is Jean-Louis Gagnon? He is a former Managing Editor of La Presse, one of Canada’s largest dailies. He is a former Editor-in-Chief of L’Evènement-Journal. He is a frequent commentator on the C.B.C. He is still another contributor to Cité Libre.

And he is a dues-paying member of the Communist Party.

[ …. ]

Jean-Louis has been a speaker at many Communist meetings. As you see on Page 14, for instance, he was one of two speakers at a meeting of the Labor Youth Federation — previously known as the Young Communist League. The other, as you see, was Fred Rose, an officer in G.R.U. (Soviet military intelligence), who later was convicted and sent to the penitentiary for Soviet espionage. Rose was one of Gagnon’s bosses in the Party. You also see on Page 14 the telegram Gagnon sent from Washington to Montreal, May 1, 1946, expressing his adoration of “the great Soviet Union.”

The papers brought by Igor Gouzenko to the Canadians from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa revealed that it was Jean-Louis Gagnon who had supplied Soviet Colonel Zabotin with the information that the exact date of D-Day was June 6, 1944.

[ …. ]

Gagnon’s wife, Hélène, is on the payroll of Peking, where she has been Mao Tse-tung’s guest, and that Pravda pays her through Bucharest, where she goes to pick it up. “

Google Newspapers is proving to be a bit of a treasure-trove for “period pieces” on Jean-Louis Gagnon. Many are in French, and so I have translated this one, by French journalist, J.-P. Robillard, who interviewed Gagnon in 1956, while the latter was working for CKAC radio station.

During the interview, Gagnon hands Robillard a short CV, which Robillard then publishes to lead off his article, titled simply:

Jean-Louis Gagnon“.

As a journalist, Communist Party member Gagnon covers two of the major conferences which led to the set-up of the Communist-infiltrated UN.

In the bio given to Robillard, Gagnon amusingly glosses over his 1946 sudden change of occupation, city, and country, from journalist in Canada to “advertising manager” in Rio de Janeiro for a company called “Brazilian Traction”. He fudges the language in French, so you can’t tell he actually left Canada and went to Brazil for this odd position.

I know from another source, which I will get for you later, that in 1946, when Gagnon fled the country on the heels of revelations by Igor Gouzenko of a Soviet spy ring operating in Canada, it was apparently Mitchell Sharp who arranged for Gagnon’s job with Brazilian Traction. Sharp thus helped Gagnon escape the spy trials that would ensue in Ottawa.

Sharp went on to have a political career in Canada under both Soviet spy Pearson and Soviet mole Trudeau, as a “Liberal”:

PARLINFO – SHARP, The Hon. Mitchell William, P.C., C.C., B.A., D.Sc., LL.D.

And they call them “The Honorable”.

A couple of facts I have to stitch together:

Pierre Trudeau and Jean-Louis Gagnon apparently have a long-standing friendship, which precedes their stint together infiltrating Canadian politics.

Both Pierre Trudeau and Jean-Louis Gagnon were trained by the Jesuits.

Mitchell Sharp will join David Rockefeller’s Trilateral Commission.

Mitchell Sharp will be Pierre Trudeau’s advisor (whispering in his ear at the 1968 Liberal Leadership Convention, which returns Soviet mole Pierre as Prime Minister of Canada while Red spy Pearson conveniently resigns):

Click here to read Jean-Louis Gagnon now.

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Notorious turncoat Philby ran interference in Gouzenko spy sensation, author finds

BY RANDY BOSWELL, POSTMEDIA NEWS SEPTEMBER 30, 2010
Source: Canada.com

Harold "Kim" Philby (British Secret Service) 1955 file photoUNDATED — Harold “Kim” Philby (British Secret Service) 1955 file photo. (Died May 1988). A new book about the history of Britain’s foreign intelligence service has shed fresh light on Canada’s most famous spy case — the 1945 defection of Soviet embassy employee Igor Gouzenko — and the clandestine efforts by notorious British double-agent Kim Philby to manipulate events in Ottawa and London to Moscow’s advantage.

Queen’s University Belfast historian Keith Jeffery, author of The Secret History of MI6: 1909-1949, says classified documents that only he was authorized to see while researching the book show the powerful and traitorous Philby issuing memos at MI6 headquarters with a “cautious and soothing tone” — a strategy designed to “downplay” the significance of what were, in fact, sensational revelations from Gouzenko about the existence of a Soviet spy ring in North America.

Igor Gouzenko (1919-1982).  Photograph by: Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Photo HandoutGouzenko, a cipher clerk at the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, defected in September 1945 with about 100 telegrams and other classified documents he’d snatched from a consular safe, exposing an extensive espionage network — including scientists, bureaucrats and even the Montreal-area socialist MP Fred Rose — operating in North America and Britain at the end of the Second World War.

Among the secret dispatches stolen by Gouzenko were several that revealed the August 1945 handover of experimental uranium samples to Soviet agents in Montreal by Alan Nunn May, a British nuclear scientist working in Canada at the time.

Gouzenko’s revelations about May, later dubbed the “Atom Spy” when his crimes became public, stunned political leaders in Canada, Britain and the U.S.

Secret papers declassified in 2007 through the U.K. National Archives and others published last year in historian Christopher Andrew’s official history of the MI5 — Britain’s domestic spy agency — have previously documented some of Philby’s efforts to stymie the Gouzenko investigation.

But Jeffery told Postmedia News that the secret MI6 files he probed contained “spanking new stuff” that showed how Philby was exploiting his position as head of counter-intelligence at MI6 to restrict information flows in London and to thwart Canadian, British and American officials who were trying to understanding the scope and implications of Gouzenko’s disclosures.

“It would appear,” Philby notes in one memo unearthed by Jeffery, that Gouzenko’s information is “genuine though not necessarily accurate in all details.”

And when Canadian and British intelligence officials make arrangements to arrest May at a meeting he had scheduled with his Soviet handler in London, Philby pointedly asserts in a report that “other members of the (Soviet spy) network will have been warned” of Gouzenko’s defection and predicts that the expected rendezvous “between May and the Soviet agent in the U.K. will fail to materialize.”

As Jeffery writes, it was Philby himself who was secretly notifying Moscow about the Soviet spy crisis unfolding in Ottawa, and his memos to unsuspecting MI6 colleagues and Canadian partners included “predictions of developments which he had already engineered himself.”

Furthermore, Jeffery discovered, Philby took steps to make certain that MI6 sent agent Roger Hollis instead of the more competent Jane Archer to interrogate Gouzenko.

Philby’s “preference, significantly, was for Hollis rather than Archer, whom he considered the abler and more knowledgeable, and therefore more of a threat.”

Jeffery — reached for an interview in Washington, where he’s scheduled to discuss his book on Friday at the Woodrow Wilson International Center — describes the Gouzenko affair as “the start of the Cold War.”

What he discovered in the secret MI6 archives on the Canadian episode, he said, “are the footprints of Kim Philby” appearing everywhere as he scrambled to dampen British interest in Gouzenko’s revelations.

“He was in a powerful position — just the right place — to impede the investigations that the Gouzenko defection triggers,” said Jeffery. “He was communicating directly to the Soviet Union. He knows that Nunn May is coming back to London and that a rendezvous is set up” with a Soviet agent outside the British Museum — and that British and Canadian intelligence officials are planning to arrest the pair at the meeting.

Philby and his Soviet contacts “are not able to warn Nunn May or to get him out — he’s kind of sacrificed,” said Jeffery. “But the Soviet link — of course crucial if he’d been captured — never turns up for the rendezvous because he’d been tipped off by Philby.”

Nunn May was eventually charged and convicted of passing official secrets to the Soviets. He was sentenced to 10 years hard labour, but served only six before his release in 1952.

He worked as a scientific researcher in Ghana until the late 1970s, and died in Britain in 2003.

The fallout from the Gouzenko affair was far-reaching and — according to many experts — the episode locked the U.S., Britain and their allies into a political and military standoff with the Soviet Union that would dominate global politics for nearly 50 years.

In the end, notes Jeffery, Philby “can’t prevent the big picture” revealed in Gouzenko’s smuggled documents that Soviet agents had penetrated North American society.

“What he manages to succeed to do in the micro-story is to manipulate things a bit and to protect the Soviet network in the United Kingdom.”

Philby’s accurate “prediction” that Nunn May’s contact won’t show at the planned sting even had the effect of reinforcing for MI6 brass “what a brilliant man he is — this man who can see how the Soviets are operating.

“Self-fulfilling prophecies are great — especially if you know what’s going to happen,” Jeffery said. “It actually confirmed his reputation within the service as a man of very sharp intelligence.”

Philby wasn’t exposed as a double-agent until 1963, when he escaped to the Soviet Union. He was “absolutely trusted” in Western intelligence circles until that time, said Jeffery.

The historian’s 800-page book — published in Britain under the title MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, 1909-1949 — was researched under what Jeffery has acknowledged was a “Faustian pact” with the spy agency that gave him unprecedented access to secret files but allowed MI6 officials to vet the final manuscript prior to publication.

© Copyright (c) Postmedia News

1972: Peter Worthington Accompanies Igor Gouzenko to British Intelligence

Foreword:

On the evening of September 5, 1945 Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk for the military attaché, Colonel Nikolai Zabotin of the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, left the embassy carrying a number of secret documents. Gouzenko tried to give the documents to the Ottawa Journal and to the Minister of Justice, Louis St. Laurent. Both turned him away.

On February 5, 1946, Prime Minister MacKenzie King informed his Cabinet about the Gouzenko case. Ten days later, after the first arrests were made, King informed Canadians of the creation of the Royal Commission to Investigate the Facts Relating to and the Circumstances Surrounding the Communication, by Public Officials and Other Persons in Positions of Trust of Secret and Confidential Information to Agents of a Foreign Power.

Gouzenko exposed Joseph Stalin’s efforts to steal nuclear secrets, and the technique of planting sleeper agents. The “Gouzenko Affair” is often credited as a triggering event of the Cold War.

The evidence provided by Gouzenko led to the arrest of 39 suspects; 18 of whom were eventually convicted of a variety of offences.

Among those convicted was Fred Rose (born Fred Rosenberg) (December 7, 1907 – March 16, 1983), the first, and the only known member of the Communist Party — at that time called the Labour-Progressive Party — to be elected to the House of Commons of Canada. Rose is also the only Member of the Canadian Parliament ever convicted of spying for a foreign country.

As a Member of Parliament, Rose proposed the first anti-hate legislation, (i.e., the criminalization of emotions through state-imposed mind control).

Also convicted in the wake of the Gouzenko disclosures were Sam Carr, the Communist Party’s national organizer; and scientist Raymond Boyer.

In the March 1963 edition of Cité Libre, a French-language, pro-Communist magazine run by Communists Gérard Pelletier and Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Boyer is listed not merely as a contributor, but as a “Collaborator”:

[calameo code=000111790b6ca30b8eea9 width=300 height=194]

Other participating Reds of Cité Libre include Stanley B. Ryerson, principal theoretician of the Communist Party and editor of Marxist Review; and Pierre Gélinas, Quebec director of AGIT-PROP (Agitation and Propaganda) for the Communist Party.

[At left below (not speaking metaphorically) Igor Gouzenko with and without the white hood he wore for anonymity]

 
__________

Former Director of MI5 Was a Soviet Spy

Source: Peter Worthington, “Former Director of MI5 Was a Soviet Spy“, August 5th, 2009 at 8:04 am”, Frum Forum; http://www.frumforum.com/former-director-of-mi5-was-a-soviet-sp/

Igor Gouzenko (1919-1982). Photograph by: Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Photo HandoutThis year, 26 years after his death in 1983, the embargoed manuscript memoir of Anthony Blunt is being reviewed more generously than the man deserves.

Blunt tells how and why he became a spy for the Soviet Union -– recruited at Cambridge by Guy Burgess who, he says, persuaded him not to join the Communist party but to spy for the NKVD, forerunner of the KGB.

Blunt says his hatred of fascism motivated him to spy for Stalin against his own country. He joined MI5, Britain’s security service, and betrayed it from within as a “talent scout” for the NKVD.

As Surveyor of the Queens’ Pictures, Blunt was knighted. When exposed as a spy and disgraced, his knighthood was rescinded, but he was never prosecuted.

Margaret Thatcher, then Britain’s PM, reviled Blunt but exonerated another suspect Soviet mole — Sir Roger Hollis, Director of MI5 from 1956-65. Hollis died under a cloud of suspicion. Former MI5 agent, Peter Wright, wrote a book, Spycatcher, which claimed Hollis was a Soviet agent, and which Mrs. Thatcher tried but failed to prevent from being published.

For some, the jury remains out on Hollis — but not for me.

Igor Gouzenko, who escaped in 1945 from the Soviet embassy in Ottawa with documents that showed a massive Soviet spy ring, asked in 1972 if I’d accompany him to a meeting with British intelligence officers.

Gouzenko had been debriefed by the British in 1945, and was wary about meeting them in 1972. He feared they might try to assassinate him, and he wanted a friendly witness.

I told him I’d be as welcome as a polecat at a garden party. He said he had no intention of committing suicide, as Czechoslovakia’s Jan Masaryk supposedly did in 1948 when Soviet agents threw him out a window in Prague. If he were to die, Gouzenko wanted it seen as murder, not suicide.

After the meeting, we met again and Gouzenko was indignant. The Brits had shown him his original debriefing. “It was fabricated,” he said. “It was such nonsense that the person who interviewed me had to be a Soviet agent. The interview had me talking of British spies in the Kremlin. There were no British spies in the Kremlin.”

“Why didn’t you say something at the time, in 1945?” I asked.

“I wanted to check the transcript for corrections, but since I didn’t have security clearance, I wasn’t allowed to see what they had written.”

I chuckled -– typical, I thought, of bureaucracy.

“Who was the British agent who interviewed you?” I asked.

“I don’t know. They wouldn’t tell me. But he was a Soviet agent.”

As it turned out, it was Roger Hollis — apparently sent by Kim Philby (whom Blunt apparently later tipped off that he was about to be arrested).

Ever since, I’ve had no doubt that Hollis was a Soviet mole.

In the early 1990s I appeared on a British TV program, The Trial of Roger Hollis, to tell Gouzenko’s story, since he had died. Then, as before, TV prosecutors [producers?] weren’t interested in the possibility of Hollis’s guilt and ignored Gouzenko’s 1972 interview with British intelligence.

Part of the reason for covering up may be that by acknowledging Hollis’ guilt, many honorable careers in British intelligence would have been diminished into nothing.

If the KGB had a pipeline into MI5 and MI6, better to ignore treason and espionage, than to admit your loyalty and patriotism were betrayed.

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